This Article Full Text (PDF) References Alert me when this article is cited Alert me if a correction is posted Citation Map Services Email this article to a friend Similar articles in this journal Alert me to new issues of the journal Add to Saved Citations Download to citation manager Request Permissions Request Reprints Add to My Marked Citations Citing Articles Citing Articles via HighWire Citing Articles via Google Scholar Citing Articles via Scopus Google Scholar Articles by ZAGARE, F. C. Search for Related Content Social Bookmarking                         What's this?

NATO, Rational Escalation and Flexible Response

Department of Political Science, State University of New York at Buffalo

A multi-stage escalation model is developed in which each stage is taken as a psychologically distinct and empirically feasible mode of conflict available to two states in a hostile, deterrent relationship. Each stage is defined by a generic, extensive-form game of mutual deterrence in which the credibility of each player's threat is allowed to vary. In the multi-stage model these games are linked to one another by way of a common outcome, creating a new game with a distinct dynamic. The results of previous research on one- and two-stage games are summarized and the model extended to games with three stages. A three-stage escalation game composed solely of one of the three possible one-stage deterrence games has strategic characteristics identical to those of its component parts: mutual credibility at each stage implies stable deterrence; mutually incredible threats at every stage result in an unstable deterrence relationship, as does an asymmetry of credibility at all three stages of the game. In other ways, however, three-stage games are more like their two-stage than their one-stage counterparts. Three-stage games exhibit the same stability-instability paradox revealed in two-stage structures and continue to support the argument that escalation dominance at any stage of the game is usually destabilizing. And, as in two-stage escalation games, the end game is the most diagnostic of the stability characteristics of a status quo outcome. The implications of the model for NATO strategy and arms control under a variety of conditions are discussed. Assumptions about end game credibility are shown to be critical in determining the wisdom of eliminating either one or two conflict stages.

Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 29, No. 4, 435-454 (1992)
DOI: 10.1177/0022343392029004006


CiteULike    Complore    Connotea    Del.icio.us    Digg    Reddit    Technorati    Twitter    What's this?

This article has been cited by other articles:

				M. R. Kraig Nuclear Deterrence in the Developing World: A Game-Theoretic Treatment Journal of Peace Research, March 1, 1999; 36(2): 141 - 167. [Abstract] [PDF]

				F. C. Zagare and D. M. Kolgour Deterrence Theory and the Spiral Model Revisited Journal of Theoretical Politics, January 1, 1998; 10(1): 59 - 87. [Abstract]

				L. J. Carlson A Theory of Escalation And International Conflict Journal of Conflict Resolution, September 1, 1995; 39(3): 511 - 534. [Abstract]

				F. C. Zagare and D. M. Kilgour Modeling 'Massive Retaliation' Conflict Management and Peace Science, January 1, 1993; 13(1): 61 - 86. [Abstract] [PDF]