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Postwar Arms Control

The Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva

This article examines the intersection between war termination and arms control leading to postwar arms control. The following two questions are explored: To what extent do war outcomes condition postwar arms control? Do arms arrangements that emerge from armed conflicts improve the postwar order in the long term? The article establishes a typology of war outcomes in function of their effects on arms control. Most armed conflicts do not create conditions favourable to lasting arms control. The examined cases that include, inter alia, Germany's disarmament after Versailles, arms restriction agreements after the Yom Kippur War, and Iraq's partial disarmament after the Gulf War, show that arms control efforts after wars tend to be linked more to the process of ending a hot conflict than to the construction of a stable postwar regime. In asymmetrical outcomes of war (i.e. with a clear winner and loser), the chances for a lasting agreement on armament are very small. The coercive nature of such agreements leaves little ground for extension to a broader, multilateral arms control agreement. In symmetrical outcomes of war (i.e. conflicts that end in stalemate), there is no fertile ground for armament control either. The temporary character of symmetrical war endings prevents cooperation between the former belligerents in areas that would affect their military capabilities. But, symmetrical war termination can produce confidence and stability through disengagement arrangements, provided that the parties are prepared to accept and comply with cooperative verification measures. The article concludes that the chances for postwar arms control may improve in the future due to the enlargement of the normative consensus resulting from the growing number of peacetime arms control regimes.

Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 30, No. 1, 29-43 (1993)
DOI: 10.1177/0022343393030001004


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