This Article Full Text (PDF) References Alert me when this article is cited Alert me if a correction is posted Citation Map Services Email this article to a friend Similar articles in this journal Alert me to new issues of the journal Add to Saved Citations Download to citation manager Request Permissions Request Reprints Add to My Marked Citations Citing Articles Citing Articles via HighWire Citing Articles via Google Scholar Citing Articles via Scopus Google Scholar Articles by Atlas, P. M. Articles by Licklider, R. Search for Related Content Social Bookmarking                         What's this?

Conflict among Former Allies after Civil War Settlement: Sudan, Zimbabwe, Chad, and Lebanon

Roy Licklider

Department of Political Science, Rutgers University

The interesting theoretical question about civil war in general is not why it begins (the possible reasons are surely too many to enumerate) or why it stops (all sorts of contingent explanations from simple fatigue to outside force may apply) but why it so often does not resume when it might. We need to comprehend this process of conflict transformation, whereby the conflict either becomes less important or is pursued without using mass violence. Understandably, most analyses and prescriptions for peacemakers focus on relationships between former enemies and attempts to reduce incentives for them to take up arms again. However, a recent analysis of four negotiated settlements of civil wars (Sudan in 1972, Zimbabwe in 1980, Chad in 1987, and Lebanon in 1989) reveals that in all four cases the critical conflict was actually between former allies. The compromises required in negotiated settlements, combined with the other problems of post-civil war societies, make such conflicts likely. In some cases they led to violence; in Zimbabwe and Lebanon conflict again reached the level of civil war. However, the ironic results was that the countries that had experienced the most violence subsequently produced new settlements which essentially confirmed the original ones and appear to be holding. In Sudan, interallied violence was quite low, but the result was that the government changed its policy, the first settlement was undermined, and the original civil war began again. Outsiders should not assume either that wartime cooperation will continue in peace or that `normal' peacetime behavior will naturally appear of its own accord. Indeed, they should probably anticipate that ad hoc wartime alliances are likely to dissolve with the risk of renewed civil violence.

Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 36, No. 1, 35-54 (1999)
DOI: 10.1177/0022343399036001003


CiteULike    Complore    Connotea    Del.icio.us    Digg    Reddit    Technorati    Twitter    What's this?

This article has been cited by other articles:

				T. Edward Flores and I. Nooruddin Democracy under the Gun Understanding Postconflict Economic Recovery Journal of Conflict Resolution, February 1, 2009; 53(1): 3 - 29. [Abstract] [PDF]

				N. Williams Refugee Participation in South Australian Child Protection Research: Power, Voice, and Representation Family and Consumer Sciences Research Journal, December 1, 2008; 37(2): 191 - 209. [Abstract] [PDF]

				T. Ohlson Understanding Causes of War and Peace European Journal of International Relations, March 1, 2008; 14(1): 133 - 160. [Abstract] [PDF]

				P. F. Diehl Just a Phase?: Integrating Conflict Dynamics Over Time Conflict Management and Peace Science, July 1, 2006; 23(3): 199 - 210. [Abstract] [PDF]

				M. Hoddie and C. Hartzell Civil War Settlements and the Implementation of Military Power-Sharing Arrangements Journal of Peace Research, May 1, 2003; 40(3): 303 - 320. [Abstract] [PDF]