This Article Full Text (PDF) References Alert me when this article is cited Alert me if a correction is posted Citation Map Services Email this article to a friend Similar articles in this journal Similar articles in Web of Science Alert me to new issues of the journal Add to Saved Citations Download to citation manager Request Permissions Request Reprints Add to My Marked Citations Citing Articles Citing Articles via HighWire Citing Articles via Web of Science (2) Citing Articles via Google Scholar Citing Articles via Scopus Google Scholar Articles by Bapat, N. A. Search for Related Content Social Bookmarking                         What's this?

Insurgency and the Opening of Peace Processes

Department of Political Science, Pennsylvania State University

One of the most striking features of insurgency is how infrequently the two sides attempt peaceful negotiation. Very often, the government refuses to grant the insurgents legitimacy as a bargaining partner. Yet, some conflicts do reach a point at which the two sides open negotiation. This article seeks to develop an explanation of the timing of negotiation during insurgency. Using a game theoretic model, this article concludes that for negotiation to take place, the insurgents must be able to survive their initial vulnerability. In the early stages of the insurgency, the government is likely to use all of its resources to repress the group. In most cases, such efforts will be successful. However, if the insurgency persists, the insurgents' capability will grow with time. By continuing to fight the government, the insurgents will begin adapting to government tactics. If the insurgents survive a certain period of fighting, a window for negotiation is likely to emerge. If the government fails to repress the insurgents early, it may be forced to negotiate under less favorable circumstances later in the conflict. However, if negotiations fail, the window will close, owing to the increasing power of the insurgents. If the insurgents develop a belief of invulnerability, the group will no longer believe it needs to negotiate with the government. These predictions are tested using duration analysis on a set of insurgencies from the State Failure Data from 1955 to 2001.

Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 42, No. 6, 699-717 (2005)
DOI: 10.1177/0022343305057888


CiteULike    Complore    Connotea    Del.icio.us    Digg    Reddit    Technorati    Twitter    What's this?

This article has been cited by other articles:

				D. E. Cunningham, K. Skrede Gleditsch, and I. Salehyan It Takes Two: A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome Journal of Conflict Resolution, August 1, 2009; 53(4): 570 - 597. [Abstract] [PDF]