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The Power of Procedure and the Procedures of the Powerful: Anti-Terror Law in the United Nations

Kendall W. Stiles

Department of Political Science, Brigham Young University, ken_stiles{at}byu.edu

This research attempts to answer the question: to what extent do institutional procedures matter in shaping international organization policies? Little empirical evidence has been applied to the question, in part because structural forces predominate in most theories and because it is difficult empirically to isolate the procedural variable. The UN’s response to the 11 September 2001 attacks, in the context of its treatment of the terrorism issue generally, allows us to compare and contrast the response of the Security Council and the General Assembly’s Sixth Committee. While the case makes it clear that structural forces have influenced the choice of procedures in both bodies over their histories, it is also clear that exogenous shocks and the search for creative policies by major powers can cause dramatic shifts in institutional procedures. In particular, the events of 11 September created a unique opening for the United States and other Western powers to attempt a radical revision of anti-terror law. This could be done most efficiently through the Security Council by use of procedural provisions that were either dormant or only recently revitalized. Efforts to cement a consensus in the GA Sixth Committee quickly ran aground against age-old questions of the definition and scope of terrorism against the backdrop of norms on occupation and self-determination. The research should rekindle interest in procedural issues and the problem of ‘forum shopping’.

Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 43, No. 1, 37-54 (2006)
DOI: 10.1177/0022343306059780


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