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Journal of Peace Research
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The Hegemon's Purse: No Economic Peace Between Democracies

Emilie M. Hafner-Burton

Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs and the Department of Politics, Princeton University

Alexander H. Montgomery

Department of Political Science, Reed College

Cox & Drury broaden the democratic peace literature from the domain of militarized conflict to economic sanctions. Their analysis of economic sanctions data from 1978 through 2000 finds that democracies are more likely to enact sanctions but are less likely to do so against other democracies. In this article, their analysis is extended in three different ways: first, their methodology and sample size are improved; second, interactions between variables are examined; and, third, additional hypotheses are tested. This article finds that the substantive effects of joint democracy on the likelihood of sanctions disappear after accounting for the disproportionate role of the United States (and correcting for method); the United States has a significantly different pattern of implementing sanctions than other states; and the trade dependence of a potential sender plays a significant role in determining the likelihood of sanctions.

Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 45, No. 1, 111-120 (2008)
DOI: 10.1177/0022343307084926
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 Journal of Conflict ResolutionHome page
E. M. Hafner-Burton and A. H. Montgomery
Power or Plenty: How Do International Trade Institutions Affect Economic Sanctions?
Journal of Conflict Resolution, April 1, 2008; 52(2): 213 - 242.
[Abstract] [PDF]