Journal of Peace Research

 

Advanced Search

Journal Navigation

Journal Home

Subscriptions

Archive

Contact Us

Table of Contents

Register here to gain access to SAGE's 500+ Journals Online

Media, War and Culture

Sign In to gain access to subscriptions and/or personal tools.
This Article
Right arrow Abstract Freely available
Right arrow Free Full Text (Free PDF) Free
Right arrow Datasets
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Right arrow Citation Map
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to Saved Citations
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Right arrow Request Reprints
Right arrow Add to My Marked Citations
Citing Articles
Right arrow Citing Articles via Google Scholar
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Asal, V.
Right arrow Articles by Beardsley, K.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
Social Bookmarking
Add to CiteULike   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us   Add to Digg   Add to Reddit   Add to Technorati  
What's this?
Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 44, No. 2, 139-155 (2007)
DOI: 10.1177/0022343307075118

Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior

Victor Asal

Department of Political Science, State University of New York, Albany,VAsal@email. albany.edu.

Kyle Beardsley

Department of Political Science, Emory University

The literature on international conflict is divided on the impact of nuclear proliferation on state conflict. The optimists' argument contends that nuclear weapons raise the stakes so high that states are unlikely to go to war when nuclear weapons enter the equation. The pessimists rebut this argument, contending that new proliferators are not necessarily rational and that having nuclear weapons does not discourage war but rather makes war more dangerous. Focusing on one observable implication from this debate, this article examines the relationship between the severity of violence in crises and the number of involved states with nuclear weapons. The study contends that actors will show more restraint in crises involving more participants with nuclear weapons. Using data from the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) project, the results demonstrate that crises involving nuclear actors are more likely to end without violence and, as the number of nuclear actors involved increases, the likelihood of war continues to fall. The results are robust even when controlling for a number of factors including non-nuclear capability. In confirming that nuclear weapons tend to increase restraint in crises, the effect of nuclear weapons on strategic behavior is clarified. But the findings do not suggest that increasing the number of nuclear actors in a crisis can prevent war, and they cannot speak to other proliferation risks.

References

  • Albright, David, 1994. `South Africa and the Affordable Bomb', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 50(4): 37—47.[ISI]
  • Allison, Graham; Owen Cote, Richard A. Falkenrath & Steven E. Miller, 1996. Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy: Containing the Threat of Loose Russian Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
  • Aron, Raymond, 1965. The Great Debate: Theories of Nuclear Strategy. Trans. E. Pawel, 1st edn. Garden City, NJ: Doubleday.
  • Arquilla, John, 1997. `Nuclear Weapons in South Asia: More May Be Manageable ', Comparative Strategy 16(1): 13—32.[CrossRef]
  • Brecher, Michael, 1999. `International Studies in the Twentieth Century and Beyond: Flawed Dichotomies, Synthesis, Cumulation', International Studies Quarterly 43(2): 213—264.[CrossRef][ISI]
  • Brecher, Michael & Patrick James, 1988. `Patterns of Crisis Management ', Journal of Conflict and Resolution 32(3): 426—456.[CrossRef]
  • Brecher, Michael & Jonathan Wilkenfeld, 2000. A Study of Crisis. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
  • Bremer, Stuart, 1992. `Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1816—1965', Journal of Conflict Resolution 36(2): 309—341.[Abstract]
  • Brito, Dagobert L. & Michael D. Intriligator, 1983. `Proliferation and the Probability of War: Global and Regional Issues', in Dagobert L. Brito, Michael D. Intriligator & Adele D. Wick, eds, Strategies for Managing Nuclear Proliferation. Lexington, MA: Lexington (135—143).
  • Brito, Dagobert L. & Michael D. Intriligator, 1996. `Proliferation and the Probability of War: A Cardinality Theorem', Journal of Conflict Resolution 40(1): 206—214.[Abstract]
  • Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce & William H. Riker, 1982. `An Assessment of the Merits of Selective Nuclear Proliferation', Journal of Conflict Resolution 25(2): 283—306.
  • Caprioli, Mary & Mark A. Boyer, 2001. `Gender, Violence, and International Crisis', Journal of Conflict Resolution 45(4): 503—518.[Abstract/Free Full Text]
  • Chellaney, Brahma, 1995. `Naiveté and Hypocrisy: Why Antiproliferation Zealotry Does Not Make Sense', Security Studies 4(4): 779—786.
  • Cimbala, Stephen, 1993. `Nuclear Weapons in the New World Order', Journal of Strategic Studies 16(2): 173—199.[ISI]
  • Cimbala, Stephen, 1998. The Past and Future of Nuclear Deterrence. Westport, CT: Praeger.
  • Cirincione, Joseph; Jon B. Wolfsthal& Miriam Rajkumar, 2002. Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
  • Clark, Mark T., 1997. `Proliferation in the Second Nuclear Age', Orbis 41(1): 130—139.
  • Cohen, Avner, 1998. Israel and the Bomb. New York: Columbia University Press.
  • Fearon, James D., 1994. `Signaling Versus the Balance of Power and Interests', Journal of Conflict Resolution 38(2): 236—269.[Abstract]
  • Fearon, James D., 2002. `Selection Effects and Deterrence', International Interactions 28(1): 5—29.[CrossRef][ISI]
  • Feaver, Peter, 1992/93. `Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear Nations', International Security 17(3): 160—187.[CrossRef][ISI]
  • Feaver, Peter & Emerson M. S. Niou, 1996. `Managing Nuclear Proliferation: Condemn, Strike, or Assist ', International Studies Quarterly 40(2): 209—234.[CrossRef][ISI]
  • Feldman, Shai, 1995. `Middle East Nuclear Stability: The State of the Region and the State of the Debate', Journal of International Affairs 49(1): 205—230.
  • Forsberg, Randall; William Driscoll, Gregory Webb & Jonathan Dean, 1995. Nonproliferation Primer: Preventing the Spread of Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Weapons. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
  • Gaddis, John Lewis, 1986. `The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System', International Security 10(4): 99—142.[CrossRef][ISI]
  • Gallois, Pierre, 1961. The Balance of Terror: Strategy for the Nuclear Age. Trans. R. Howard. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.
  • Geller, Daniel S., 1990. `Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Crisis Escalation', Journal of Conflict Resolution 34(2): 291—310.[Abstract]
  • Geller, Daniel S., 2003. `Nuclear Weapons and the Indo-Pakistani Conflict: Global Implications of a Regional Power Cycle', International Political Science Review 24(1): 137—150.[Abstract/Free Full Text]
  • Goheen, Robert F., 1983. `Problems of Proliferation: U.S. Policy and the Third World', World Politics 35(2): 194—215.[CrossRef][ISI]
  • Goldstein, Avery, 2000. Deterrence and Security in the 21st Century. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
  • Hagerty, Devin T., 1998. Lessons from South Asia. London: MIT Press.
  • Hanson, Marianne, 2002. `Nuclear Weapons as Obstacles to International Security', International Relations 16(3): 361—380.[Abstract/Free Full Text]
  • Hewitt, Joseph, 2003. `Dyadic Processes and International Crises', Journal of Conflict Resolution 47(5): 669—692.[Abstract/Free Full Text]
  • Horton, Roy E., 1999. Out of South Africa: Pretoria's Nuclear Weapons Experience. Occasional Paper, USAF Institute for National Security Studies.
  • Huth, Paul K., 1999. `Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debates', Annual Review of Political Science 2: 25—48.[CrossRef]
  • Huth, Paul K. & Bruce Russett, 1988. `Deterrence Failure and Crisis Escalation', International Studies Quarterly 32(1): 29—45.[CrossRef][ISI]
  • Huth, Paul K. & Bruce Russett, 1990. `Testing Deterrence Theory: Rigor Makes a Difference', World Politics 42(4): 466—501.[CrossRef][ISI]
  • Kahn, Saira, 2001. `A Nuclear South Asia: Resolving or Protracting the Protracted Conflict?', International Relations 15(4): 61—78.[Free Full Text]
  • Kaiser, Karl, 1989. `Nonproliferation and Nuclear Deterrence', Survival31(2): 123—136.
  • Karl, David J., 1996/97. `Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers ', International Security 21(3): 87—119.[CrossRef][ISI]
  • Kilgour, D. Marc & Frank C. Zagare, 1991. `Credibility, Uncertainty and Deterrence', American Journal of Political Science 35(2): 305—334.[CrossRef][ISI]
  • King, Gary; Michael Tomz & Jason Wittenberg, 2000. `Making the Most of Statistical Analyses: Improving Interpretation and Presentation', American Journal of Political Science 44(2): 347—361.[CrossRef][ISI]
  • Kokoski, Richard, 1995. Technology and the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. New York: Oxford University Press, in conjunction with SIPRI.
  • Lavoy, Peter R., 1995. `The Strategic Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation', Security Studies 4(4): 695—753.
  • Lebow, Richard Ned & Janice Gross Stein, 1990. `Deterrence: The Elusive Dependent Variable', World Politics 42(3): 208—224.
  • Lemke, Douglas & William Reed, 2001. `War and Rivalry Among Great Powers', American Journal of Political Science 45(2): 457—469.[CrossRef][ISI]
  • Liberman, Peter, 2001. `The Rise and Fall of the South African Bomb', International Security 26(2): 45—86.[CrossRef][ISI]
  • McGwire, Michael, 1994. `Is There Future for Nuclear Weapons?', International Affairs 70(2): 211—228.
  • Marshall, Monty & Keith Jaggers, 2002. `Polity IV Project: Dataset User's Manual' (http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity).
  • Mason, Ronald, 1992. `Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in Europe', in David Goldfischer & Thomas W. Graham, eds, Nuclear Deterrence and Global Security in Transition. Oxford: Westview (133—156).
  • Mashhadi, Hassan, 1994. `Multilateral Agreements', in Serge Sur, ed., Disarmament and Arms Limitation Obligations: Problems of Compliance and Enforcement. Brookfield, VT: Dart-mouth (105—118).
  • Mearsheimer, John, 1990. `Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War', International Security 15(1): 5—56.[Medline] [Order article via Infotrieve]
  • Morgan, Patrick M., 2003. Deterrence Now. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Osgood, Robert E. & Robert W. Tucker, 1967. Force, Order, and Justice. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
  • Payne, Keith B., 1997. Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky.
  • Powell, Robert, 1988. `Nuclear Brinkmanship with Two-Sided Incomplete Information ', American Political Science Review 82(1): 155—178.[CrossRef][ISI]
  • Powell, Robert, 1989. `Nuclear Deterrence and the Strategy of Limited Retaliation ', American Political Science Review 83(2): 503—519.[CrossRef][ISI]
  • Powell, Robert, 1990. Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility. New York: Cambridge University Press.
  • Powell, Robert, 1999. In the Shadow of Power. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
  • Powell, Robert, 2003. `Nuclear Deterrence Theory, Nuclear Proliferation, and National Missile Defense', International Security 27(4): 86—118.[CrossRef]
  • Sagan, Scott, 1994. `The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons', International Security 18(4): 66—107.[CrossRef][ISI]
  • Sagan, Scott, 1996/97. `Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?', International Security 21(3): 54—86.[CrossRef][ISI]
  • Sagan, Scott & Kenneth Waltz, 2003. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed. New York: Norton.
  • Schelling, Thomas C., 1960. The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
  • Schelling, Thomas C., 1962. `Nuclear Strategy in Europe', World Politics 14(3): 421—433.[CrossRef][ISI]
  • Schelling, Thomas C., 1966. Arms and Influence. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
  • Singer, J. David; Stuart Bremer & John Stuckey, 1972. `Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820—1965 ', in Bruce Russett, ed., Peace, War, and Numbers. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage (19—48).
  • Singh, Jaswant, 1998. `Against Nuclear Apartheid', Foreign Affairs 77(5): 41—52.[ISI]
  • Snyder, Glenn & Paul Diesing, 1977. Conflict Among Nations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
  • Tomz, Michael; Jason Wittenberg & Gary King, 2003. Clarify: Software for Interpreting and Presenting Statistical Results, Version 2.1 (http://gking.harvard.edu).
  • van Creveld, Martin, 1993. Nuclear Proliferation and the Future of Conflict. New York: Free Press.
  • Waltz, Kenneth N., 1990. `Nuclear Myths and Political Realities', American Political Science Review 84(3): 731—745.[CrossRef][ISI]
  • Zagare, Frank C. & D. Marc Kilgour, 1993. `Asymmetric Deterrence', International Studies Quarterly 37(1): 1—27.[CrossRef][ISI]
  • Zagare, Frank C. & D. Marc Kilgour, 2000. Perfect Deterrence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us   Add to Digg Digg   Add to Reddit Reddit   Add to Technorati Technorati    What's this?



This Article
Right arrow Abstract Freely available
Right arrow Free Full Text (Free PDF) Free
Right arrow Datasets
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Right arrow Citation Map
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to Saved Citations
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Right arrow Request Reprints
Right arrow Add to My Marked Citations
Citing Articles
Right arrow Citing Articles via Google Scholar
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Asal, V.
Right arrow Articles by Beardsley, K.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
Social Bookmarking
Add to CiteULike   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us   Add to Digg   Add to Reddit   Add to Technorati  
What's this?